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Battling Transaction Costs: Establishing an e-Exchange System for 
Coaseian Bargaining1 
Márton Szemenyei2 
The role of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in environmental protection has become a significant 
topic in the last decade. Most existing ICT systems, however, don’t go beyond the traditional role of distributing 
information to their users. Moreover, most of these software systems don’t provide an integrated solution for 
several connected problems, which makes them hard to use.  
In this paper we will explore the use of software in environmental protection in a top-down approach, 
starting with the basic problems of environmental economics, namely internalizing externalities. We will propose 
a system that will try to achieve this by providing solutions to significantly decrease the transaction costs of 
Coaseian bargaining, while also providing a platform for other types of tools.  
The goal of this paper is to give an in-depth analysis of the proposed software. In order to do that, we 
describe the system in a non-technical, feature-oriented way, and analyze its most important functions. We will 
focus on establishing the requirements of the system based on the results of environmental and institutional 
economics. The most important part of our work is a detailed cost-benefit analysis of creating and maintaining the 
software, which includes the effect on the costs of Coaseian bargaining. 
Keywords: environmental policy, private bargains, software  
JEL Codes: Q01, Q58 
Harc a tranzakciós költségek ellen: Egy e-tőzsde rendszer létrehozása 
coase-i alkuk számára 
Az elmúlt évtizedben az infokommunikációs technológiák (ICT – Information Communication Technology) 
szerepe a környezetvédelemben releváns területté vált. A legtöbb létező ICT rendszer azonban nem emelkedik az 
információszolgáltatás hagyományos szerepe fölé. Ezen felül a legtöbb rendszer nem képes több, összefüggő 
problémára integrált megoldást nyújtani, ami meglehetősen megnehezíti a használatukat. 
A tanulmány feltárja a szoftveres megoldások lehetséges szerepét a környezetvédelemben, egy top-down 
megközelítés segítségével. Ebben a megközelítésben a téma kiindulópontja a környezetgazdaságtan alapvető 
problémája – az externáliák internalizálása. A cikkben ajánlást teszünk egy rendszerre, amely képes a coase-i 
magánalkuk tranzakciós költségeinek csökkentésével az alapproblémát kezelni, miközben teret ad más eszközök 
alkalmazására is. 
A tanulmány során a tárgyalt szoftver részletes elemzését végezzük el, melyhez először bemutatjuk a 
rendszer technikai részleteket mellőző, funkció-orientált leírását, valamint elemezzük a leglényegesebb 
szolgáltatásait. Az elemzés és a leírás során a hangsúlyt a platform követelményeinek megadására fektetjük, 
amelyeket a környezetgazdaságtan eredményei alapján állítunk. A munkánk fő része a szoftver létrehozásának és 
fenntartásának költség-haszon elemzése, amely a coase-i magánalkuk költségeire kifejtett hatásokat is magába 
foglalja. 
Kulcsszavak: környezetszabályozás, magánalkuk, szoftver  
JEL-kódok: Q01, Q58
                                                 
1. This paper is based on ’Battling Transaction Costs: Establishing an e-Exchange System for Coaseian 
Bargaining’ (Szemenyei, 2013) presented at the Economic Section of the 32nd National Scientific Students' 
Associations Conference where it was awarded First Place in the Session of Environmental Economics, 
Sustainable Development. The study was prepared under the supervision of Tibor Princz-Jakovics, assistant 
professor at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences. 
2. The author is a PhD student at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Electrical 
Engineering and Informatics (szemenyei AT iit.bme.hu). 
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Introduction, goals 
Sustainability is one of the key challenges faced by economies around the globe. It is generally 
recognized that efficient environmental policy is essential to preserve natural and artificial 
resources for future generations, while maintaining economic growth.  
The main goal of environmental policy is to internalize externalities so that environmental 
factors may be considered in economic decision making. Usually, we consider two types of 
policy tools: Pigovian and Coaseian methods. Pigovian environmental policy (Pigou, 1920) 
relies on direct government intervention, such as the use of regulation or economic incentives 
that force agents to consider their impact on the environment. When using Pigovian tools, the 
government determines the optimal level of the use of nature and enforces it. 
Coaseian policy on the other hand relies on private bargains of the affected parties to 
solve environmental issues (Coase, 1960). In this case the optimal level is determined and 
enforced by the parties themselves, the government only provides the infrastructure necessary 
to enable bargains. One of the main advantages of Coaseian policy is flexibility, since it allows 
parties to consider the peculiarities of individual situations. However, practical difficulties may 
arise during deal-making that may make bargains infeasible under real-world circumstances. 
These difficulties are usually modeled by assuming that the costs of the bargaining 
process – the transaction costs – are non-zero, therefore the Coase theorem, which is the basis 
of the efficiency of private bargaining, doesn’t hold. Therefore in cases where transaction costs 
are considerable regulators are left with Pigovian alternatives. However, it is possible to reduce 
the transaction costs of bargaining thus making private deal-making a viable alternative. It is 
known that establishing legal and institutional infrastructures designed to aid bargaining can 
significantly reduce tranasction costs. A general distribution of property rights for many types 
of natural capital is often discussed as part of such an infrastructure. 
In our work, instead of focusing on the institutional and legal part of such an 
infrastructure, we discuss the possibility of establishing a software platform that can tackle 
several essential practical and administrative problems that arise during bargaining. Our major 
argument for doing this is that in order to convince lawmakers to undertake such a monumental 
task practical issues need to be addressed first. 
In this paper, we collect and discuss some of the major practical problems, and based on 
that we briefly describe the software platform needed to solve them by presenting its most 
important features. It is worth noting that our description of the software system will be a 
feature-oriented discussion free of technological details. We also perform a preliminary cost-
benefit analysis in order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed platform and to determine 
the possible social benefits of the system. 
In the next chapter we introduce the theoretical background and difficulties of Coaseian 
bargains, focusing on transaction costs. We also present a few cases of private deals in the past 
and some of the existing environmental software systems. Methodology chapter is dedicated to 
presenting our methodology for creating the concept design of the software and for performing 
the cost-benefit analysis. In The proposed system chapter we discuss the concept of the software 
infrastructure and present some of the most important features in greater detail. Following that 
we present the results of the costs-benefit analysis and draw the necessary conclusions 
regarding the proposed infrastructure. 
Background 
In this chapter we discuss the theoretical background of private bargaining, by defining the 
environmental problem and stating the Coase theorem. We will then focus on transaction costs 
and examine the factors that influence these costs. Then, to complete the discussion we present 
a few relevant cases for private environmental bargains. Lastly, at the end of the section we 
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give a brief overview of the existing environmental software systems and highlight some of 
their shortcomings. 
A good definition of the environmental conflict can be found in Table 1, which divides 
the problem into two types: source, and sink type conflicts. To make things simpler, in the rest 
of the paper we will only discuss sink-type problems. This can be done without loss of 
generality, since source-type problems can be modeled as the emission of 
“economic/environmental antimatter” which destroys natural resources. 
Table 1: Environmental Conflicts 
Source Problems Sink Problems 
By accelerating consumption of ecologically neutral, 
non-renewable natural resources, causing them to run 
out, we hurt future generations. 
By emitting pollution or waste we damage the health 
of the ecosystem. 
By expropriating resources that play a role in 
ecological systems, we damage the ecosystem. 
This pollution can also damage human health and 
artificial capital. 
Source: Bartus & Akos, 2012 
It is generally accepted that market failures, most commonly externalities are responsible 
for the existence of these conflicts. Therefore the aim of environmental policy should be to 
internalize externalities, in turn making the market closer to efficient. Coaseian policy tools rely 
on the Coase theorem which states that if the rights of the parties are established ex ante, and 
the transaction costs are zero, then the private bargain between parties will achieve an optimal 
result (Bartus & Akos, 2012). It can be argued that the first requirement is unnecessary, since if 
rights are not known, then effort and money has to be spent to establish them, therefore 
transaction costs cannot be zero. 
There is a stronger form of the theorem, which states, that is in addition of the two 
previous conditions, there is no effect on the wealth of the parties, than the private deal will be 
pareto optimal and invariant to the initial distribution of the rights. Of course there still may be 
differences between outcomes regarding the distribution of wealth and social justice. 
A major critique of the theorem is that transaction costs are hardly ever zero, which makes 
the theorem irrelevant. True, in cases where the costs of bargaining are higher than the possible 
gains of a successful deal, the outcome of the bargain will not only be suboptimal, but actually 
nonexistent, since the parties will choose not to negotiate. Still, this critique misunderstands the 
point of the theorem. It is not meant to be an interesting thought experiment inspecting an 
unrealistic world, but an argument for recognizing the significance of transaction costs (or a 
Coase first called them “the costs of using the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937)). 
In this light the theorem provides us with a way to implement successful environmental 
policy without direct government intervention and its classical pitfalls: enabling private 
bargains by reducing transaction costs. However, in order to achieve this we must understand 
transactions costs and the factors and variables that determine their magnitude. These factors 
can be divided into two groups: behavioral attributes and transaction attributes. 
Behavioral attributes, such as bounded rationality and opportunism are attached to the 
bargaining parties (Williamson, 1998). As discussed by Brad DeLong (DeLong, 2013), the latter 
can be a serious hindrance in bargains, especially if coupled with unwise distribution of 
property rights. On the other hand, transaction attributes are tied to the situation or the bargain 
itself. These factors include uncertainty and frequency of the transaction which influence 
transaction costs through relatively straightforward mechanisms (Williamson, 1981). 
The factors considered to be one of the most important by Williamson is asset specificity. 
(Williamson, 1981) In such situations one of the parties is in possession of a unique asset that 
is required for the bargain. This asset can be knowledge, a specific skill or expertise, or more 
commonly in the case of environmental issues a specific location. The party in possession of 
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the asset will be in a monopolistic situation which (coupled with opportunism) may result in a 
serious increase in transaction costs. A final problem that is common in case of environmental 
issues is the presence of too many parties at the bargaining table. A simple case of air pollution 
can involve several towns, each with thousands of citizens. In this case dealing with each of 
them individually is simply impossible. 
In order to illustrate the difficulties of Coaseian bargaining we provide two cases of 
bargains. The first is the relatively recent dispute between the government of Újpest and the 
organizers of the Sziget festival. The major of Újpest attempted to get the organizers of the 
festival to reduce the noise pollution caused by the loud concerts. What followed was several 
years of litigation which the government eventually lost, after the ruling of the Appeals Court 
in 2009. Following that, the new major managed to bargain with the organizers which 
eventually resulted in the organizers agreeing to reduce noise levels by rearranging stages and 
other methods. (zipp, 2011) Even if the bargain was successful in the end, it can be argued that 
with the proper distribution of rights and a bargaining infrastructure the court battle would have 
been avoided. 
The other, lesser known case is the construction of a hazardous waste incinerator in the 
town of Garé. (Bartus, 2006) In this case the townspeople managed to reach a deal with the 
contractor company that was responsible for the building of the incinerator. The deal contained 
measures to minimize the risks the town’s citizens were facing. They, however, failed to include 
the citizens of neighboring villages who would also have been affected by the project. 
Eventually, a negative campaign against the incinerator succeeded in stopping the project. Here, 
the problem is much clearer: the insufficient information about whom the incinerator would 
affect and how resulted in an inappropriate deal. 
In the final part of this chapter we present a short overview of the environmental software 
systems available today and discuss their key shortcomings. The most common environmental 
software systems are environmental and/or pollution databases. There are several national sites, 
such as OKIR (OKIR, 2015) or TEIR (TEIR, 2015) in Hungary, or PortalU (Konstantinidis, 
Kruse, Klenke, 2009) in Germany, while there are also a few higher-level databases, such as 
CEIP. Another project worth mentioning is the INSPIRE (European Comission, 2015) 
directive, which establishes an EU level spatial database, however, at the time of this writing it 
is not completed yet. 
One can find tools for certain tasks required for bargaining, such as pollution propagation 
estimation (Vibrocomp, 2015), monitoring tools (Schabauer, Schimak, Dünnebeil, 
Litzenberger, 2012), or attempts at automatic evaluation of certain aspects of the state of the 
environment (Steuer, Kunert, Schulz, Schilcher, 2010). It is worth noting that these tools are 
fragmented, there is no “do it all” system that would grant users access to every required tool, 
and there is no solution for guiding the user through the steps of the deal-making process. Most 
of the information systems mentioned above suffer from poor usability and they provide little 
or no explanation for the effects that certain pollutant might have and no information about the 
severity of the pollution. 
Methodology 
In this chapter we detail our methodology to assess the feasibility of the proposed software 
system. In order to do that, we perform the cost benefit analysis, while we also estimate the 
social costs and benefits of establishing the ICT and the institutional infrastructure. However, 
in order to determine these costs and benefits at least the basic design of the proposed system 
needs to be known. Since the necessary features of the system have not been determined yet, 
we use an agile software design methodology called the Rational Unified Process (RUP) to 
provide an initial design of the system that can be used for later estimates. A few key details of 
this design are discussed in The proposed system chapter.  
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In our analysis, we consider the costs of creating and maintaining both the software 
system and the necessary legal/institutional infrastructure. Similarly, the social benefits of 
lower transactions costs are also estimated and included in the cost-benefit analysis. In order to 
collect all parts of the costs we employ a transaction cost typology used in institutional 
economics (McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, Kuperan, 2005). Here, transaction costs mean 
the costs of institutional change. (Barbier, 2011) The typology used and the actual cost types 
are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: The transaction Cost Typology 
Types of Transaction Costs Actual Parts of Costs 
Research and Information Data Collection 
Legislation Passing Legislation 
Design & Implementation 
Development & Maintenance 
Server Upkeep 
Carbon Emission Caused by the System 
Support & Administration 
Legal Support 
Administration 
Contracting 
Benefits from lower bargaining costs 
Ad Revenue 
Monitoring Detection Costs of extra monitoring equipment 
Prosecution/Enforcement No change in costs 
Source: own edition 
For a fair share of the costs above, the average number of monthly users of the system is 
a key determinant. Therefore, in order to give valid estimates of these costs, the number of users 
has to be determined as well. We project the number of monthly users based on existing web 
pages with similar functionality, namely Ügyfélkapu, the e-government portal of the Hungarian 
government. From this data, we derive a pessimistic, a realistic and an optimistic estimate and 
calculate the costs and benefits for all three cases. In addition to this, we also provide projections 
of the costs and benefits for both a Hungary-only and an EU-level application of the system. 
Our estimates for the number of users, as well as several other key assumptions are shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Key assumptions 
Length of estimation: 10 years 
Discount Rate: 5.5% 
Minimum Monthly Users 20,000 
Average Monthly Users 100,000 
Maximum Monthly Users 200,000 
Minimum Monthly Users (EU) 1,000,000 
Average Monthly Users (EU) 5,000,000 
Maximum Monthly Users (EU) 10,000,000 
Source: own edition 
It is important to note, that our estimates have high uncertainty, while the risks of erring 
on either side are not symmetric. We believe that in this early phase, overestimating the benefits 
is the more severe error, therefore we increase our estimate of total costs and decrease the 
benefits by 50% to arrive at a more conservative projection. 
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The proposed system 
In this chapter we provide a short description of the proposed software system and some of its 
most important functions. The design of the system itself was created using the Rational Unified 
Process, which is an iterative and incremental software design process. This means that first the 
coarse outline of the system is set up and filled with more detail at every step. At the first stage 
the general vision of the system is established and its functionality discussed. 
We establish functional requirements by collecting the most relevant practical issues we 
see with private bargaining and attempt to devise a feature that is able to treat the particular 
problems effectively. Our vision is an internet portal that connects possible parties and provides 
them a workflow that guides them through the step of the deal-making process and tools to aid 
them at step. The key steps are collecting information, bargaining and contracting, and 
monitoring. The main issues and features to solve them are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Obstacles and requirements designed to overcome them 
Obstacle Requirement 
It is hard to find all information about the quality of 
one’s environment in one place. Users should be able to access understandable 
environmental information including effects It requires a large effort to understand the particular 
effects that pollution has on someone. 
It is hard to find the source of the pollution in one’s 
property. 
Users should be able to link pollution to the source 
with one click 
It is difficult to find out what one can do to reduce the 
pollution in his or her property. 
Users should be guided through the bargaining 
process by a clear workflow 
Users should be able to search environmental 
information about products, and green technologies 
There is no established infrastructure for negotiating 
and striking environmental contracts. 
Parties should be able to use computer-aided 
negotiating and contracting 
Users should be able to access e-Exchange system 
for emission permits from within the system 
In the case of new economic activities the process of 
impact assessment, and/or authorization can be long 
and expensive. 
The administrators should be able to perform quick 
computer-aided propagation estimation and impact 
evaluation 
If many are affected by a pollution, then negotiation 
will be very expensive. 
Users should be able to form groups and enter 
negotiations as a group 
Users should be able to access group decision aiding 
services 
Source: own edition 
The first core feature to discuss is providing understandable information, where users can 
access environmental data on a map-based service. There are several important steps towards 
making information understandable for users who possess no expertise in environmental 
protection. The first is to always display real-world effects of the pollution users are exposed 
to. The second is to let the users choose the level of detail that the system uses to display 
information. This way the users can fine-tune the information they are presented. A further 
integral part of providing information that users must be able to connect the effects they endure 
with the cause of those effects easily. 
The second main function of the software platform is contract creation. This is a relatively 
difficult task that usually requires the involvement of lawyers. This, however raises transaction 
costs significantly. Still, it is possible to handle this difficulty: The system may provide 
intelligent contract templates that can be easily filled with specific information and turned into 
a complete contract using document automation software. Such templates can be made for most 
common situations thus virtually increasing the frequency of transactions. Advanced users may 
also access intelligent contract elements that they can use to build new templates usable for less 
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common scenarios. Using this solution lawyers are needed only to provide support and to 
handle peculiar cases. 
The last key requirement to discuss aims to solve the problem of too many parties 
mentioned in Background chapter. The software allows users to form groups and enter 
negotiations as groups thus reducing the number of parties at the bargaining table. However, if 
we leave it at that, the feature will only hide the problem: the difficulties caused by too many 
parties will simply happen inside the group. Therefore it is essential to supply groups with 
decision-making tools to aid them in reaching a unified stance. To achieve this users need to 
have access to individual decision support methods, such as the ones discussed in (Fülöp, 2004). 
In addition to that, group decision support software is also required to provide means of 
communication and voting for users. A viable candidate for a group decision support system is 
Dotmocracy (Nash – Diceman, 2010), which allows users to discuss and rate ideas, while also 
giving them opportunity to voice concerns or offer alternatives. 
Results 
In this section we present our estimates for the costs of the ICT and the institutional 
infrastructure. We have already introduced the individual cost types in Methodology chapter, 
here, we will give a short description for how we estimated each part. For a more detailed 
derivation of the estimates, please refer to (Szemenyei, 2015). 
We begin our discussion with the estimates of the costs related to the software 
infrastructure. The first part of the costs is development and maintenance costs. In order to 
determine the costs associated with these activities, we collect the detailed functional 
requirements (use cases) of our system, and use the methodology provided by (Carroll, 2005) 
and (Jones, 2006). Another important part of the ICT infrastructure costs are server expenses. 
To determine these costs we first need to estimate the amount of traffic our system would 
produce and the number of servers that can handle the estimated traffic. Once that is done, we 
can use estimates of the 10-year TCO of servers (APC, 2005) to derive the costs. 
The last important part of the software-related expenses is the cost of carbon-emission 
caused by the servers. To derive these costs, we use the aforementioned estimates of the data 
transmission caused by our system, and use the following results (Taylor – Koomey, 2008) to 
estimate the resulting carbon emission. There is one more category of costs that should be 
discussed here, despite not being part of the software system in a strict sense, and that is the 
cost of mobile measurement units. Here, we only consider the costs of mobile computer systems 
that record and transmit the measured data, and exclude the costs of the measurement devices 
themselves. The reason for this is that the extremely wide variety of pollution makes this 
estimate problematic, and far beyond the scope of this paper. Luckily, giving an estimate of the 
number of mobile units needed is enough to estimate of their costs. 
The other large group of costs are expenses related to the implementation and 
maintenance of the legal and institutional infrastructure required by the system. The first part 
of these costs are legislation costs. Here, we assume, that in order to implement the system, an 
average-sized law needs to be passed by the Hungarian or the European Parliament. We 
estimate the cost of passing a law by using the methodology described in (Wilson, Nghiem, 
Foster, Cobiac, Blakely, 2012). The other part of the implementation costs is related to data 
collection. To estimate these expenses, we give a man-hour projection of the effort required to 
collect several kinds of data required by the system: spatial, environmental, and impact 
assessment data. 
The maintenance of the infrastructure is also a crucial part of the costs. Here, we consider 
two important types of costs: administration costs and expenses of providing legal support for 
users. Both of these costs depend heavily on the number of monthly users, and the number of 
transactions they initiate, therefore an estimate for the number of transactions is required. With 
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that, by estimating the administrative and supporting effort per transaction, the total cost can be 
calculated. 
The single financial benefit of our system is revenue from ads displayed by the system. 
Here, we consider two types of advertising. First, the system could display ads aimed at the 
general population. Secondly, green technology companies could use the system to recommend 
their solutions to other parties currently engaging in negotiation. To estimate the ad revenues 
of the system, we use the following online model (MarginHound, n.d.). Our final estimates for 
the costs of the infrastructure are shown in Table 5 below. The social benefits of the system 
will be estimated in the second part of the section. 
Table 5: The total financial return of the system (in 1000s of dollars) 
Number of Users (1000) 20 100 200 1,000 5,000 10,000 
Development & Maintenance $924 $924 $924 $1,445 $1,445 $1,445 
Server Costs $76 $96 $153 $688 $3,441 $6,882 
Data Collection $55 $55 $55 $1,859 $1,859 $1,859 
Carbon Emission $11 $55 $111 $561 $2,798 $5,594 
Legal Support $271 $271 $271 $4,237 $10,593 $21,187 
Legislation $507 $507 $507 $1,298 $1,298 $1,298 
Administration $116 $116 $232 $1,816 $8,717 $17,252 
Motes $49 $49 $49 $3,214 $3,214 $3,214 
Ad Revenues $307 $1,537 $3,075 $15,376 $76,883 $153,767 
Total Return -$1,704 -$538 $768 $256 $43,515 $95,032 
Source: own edition 
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the quantitative assessment of the social benefits 
of lower transaction costs. We will begin by examining the effect on a single transaction by 
breaking down the bargaining process into functional units and estimating the effort required 
for each unit before and after the system was established. We will then use our previous estimate 
of the number of monthly transactions to compute the total social benefits. The effects on a 
single transaction and the total social benefits are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 below. For a 
detailed discussion of these estimates, please refer to (Szemenyei, 2015). 
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Table 6: Our estimates for the effort of one bargain with and without the systems 
assistance 
Activity Effort Without (man-hours) Effort With (man-hours) 
Find information about pollution around you 0.5 0.1 
Find parties to deal with 4 0.05 
Find alternatives 8 0.5 
EIA or other assessment 32 0.5 
Effort spent Negotiating 20 6 
Effort of making a decision 20 6 
Lawyer costs of making a contract 17.6 0.01 
Litigation costs 11 1.1 
Costs of reporting a problem 0.5 0.1 
Administrative costs of monitoring a deal 2 0.1 
Total 116.1 14.46 
Source: own edition 
Table 7: The total 10-year social benefits of the system (millions of dollars) 
Number of Users (1000) 20 100 200 1,000 5,000 10,000 
Total 10-Year Social Benefits $21 $106 $213 $1,668 $8,341 $16,682 
Source: own edition 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we discussed the importance of tackling some of the important practical problems 
that arise during private bargaining. We argue that a way to make general bargaining feasible 
is needed before the distribution of property rights is discussed. We began our discussion by 
exploring the literature of transaction costs and by presenting existing environmental software. 
We then presented our proposal for an ICT (Information and Communication Technology) 
platform that can make private deal-making feasible by decreasing transaction costs. We 
completed our analysis by performing a cost-benefit analysis that gave a preliminary estimate 
on the 10-year social return of the software infrastructure. 
We have been successful in providing features that are powerful tools to mitigate the 
practical problems we collected. Therefore, we conclude that the software platform is likely to 
provide a significant decrease in the costs of bargaining. Our own cost-benefit analysis has 
shown that the social return of the ICT infrastructure is likely to be positive. Our investigation 
has been fruitful, since we were able to find solution to most (but not all) problems of 
bargaining. It goes without saying that the we do not claim that a software can solve all the 
difficulties of deal-making, since the existence of other types (legal, institutional, etc.) of 
infrastructure are essential to the success of our proposal. The cost-benefit analysis was 
performed assuming that the distribution of rights has been completed (and it is included among 
the costs). Without that the efficiency of the software would be greatly diminished, however 
the information providing feature would still be a significant improvement to current 
conditions. 
Based on our result, we recommend further investigation of the role of software systems 
in environmental protection. It is likely that there are other features and possibilities that are 
worth including in a general environmental platform. Also, by further refining the requirements 
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of the system will increase the accuracy of the development costs, while many of our estimates 
in the cost-benefit analysis require further consideration. 
Also we have not discussed the legal and institutional infrastructure required by our 
system in depth. Still, these are topics that require a significant amount of consideration. There 
are several possible methods for distributing property (or emission) rights which differ greatly 
in terms of efficiency and social justice, something we avoided in this paper. We have also 
avoided discussing the macroeconomic effects of large-scale private bargaining. A short 
discussion can be found in (Szemenyei, 2015). 
Acknowledgements 
I’d like to express my gratitude towards Tibor Princz-Jakovics who supervised this research 
project and aided me greatly with his experience and insights. 
References 
Rasmussen, N. (2005). Determining Total Cost of Ownership for Data Center and Network Room 
Infrastructure. White Paper, Retreived from http://www.apcmedia.com/salestools/CMRP-
5T9PQG/CMRP-5T9PQG_R4_EN.pdf?sdirect=true 
Barbier, E. B. (2011). Transaction Costs and the Transition to Evnironmentally Sustainable 
Development. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 1, 58-69, 
DOI: 10.1016/j.eist.2011.02.001 
Bartus, G. (2006). A Hulladékgazdálkodás Alapjai. Nemzeti Szakképzési Intézet: Budapest, Retreived 
from http://docplayer.hu/4939435-Bartus-gabor-a-hulladekgazdalkodas-alapjai.html 
Bartus, G.   ̶ Akos, S. (2012). Környezetgazdaságtani problémák elemzése - Közpolitikai eszközök és 
joggazdaságtani magyarázatok. Pázmány Law Working Papers, Retreived from 
http://d18wh0wf8v71m4.cloudfront.net/docs/wp/2012/2012-42-Bartus-Szalai.pdf 
Carroll, E. R. (2005). Estimating Software Based on Use Case Points. 20th ACM SIGPLAN. New 
York, DOI: 10.1145/1094855.1094960 
Coase, R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405, DOI: 10.2307/2626876 
Coase, R. (1960). Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44, 
DOI: 10.1086/466560. 
DeLong, B. (2013, 04 20). The Economist As...?: Draft Talk: Notre Dame Public Intellectualism 
Conference. Retreived from http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2013/04/20130423-the-
economist-as-presentation-script-notre-dame-public-intellectualism-conference.html 
European Comission. (2015, 07 21). INSPIRE. Retreived from http://inspire.ec.europa.eu 
Fülöp, J. (2004). Introduction to Decision Making methods. Workshop on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Informatics, Retreived from 
http://academic.evergreen.edu/projects/bdei/documents/decisionmakingmethods.pdf  
Jones, C. (2006). The Economics of Software Maintenance in the Twenty First Century. Chicago: 
Software Productivity Research, Inc, DOI: 10.1.1.88.7697. 
Konstantinidis, S. – Kruse, F. – Klenke, M. (2009). Current State of the German Environmental 
Information Portal PortalU. EnviroInfo 2009. Berlin, DOI: 10.4018/978-1-61520-981-
1.ch020. 
MarginHound. (n.d.). Real Revenue Model statistics for Small Websites. Retrieved 06 30, 2015, from 
http://www.marginhound.com/revenue-model-study-for-small-websites/ 
McCann, L. – Colby, B. – Easter, K. W. – Kasterine, A. – Kuperan, K. V. (2005). Transaction Cost 
Measurement for Evaluating Environmental Policies. Ecological Economics, 52(4), 527-542, 
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.08.002. 
Nash, J. – Diceman, J. (2010). Dotmocracy Handbook. Retrieved 06 30, 2015, from 
http://dotmocracy.org/sites/dotmocracy.net/files/dotmocracy_handbook_2-02_lowrez.pdf 
OKIR (2015, 07 21). Retrieved from http://www.okir.hu 
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. London, Macmillan, ISBN: 978-0-230-24931-8, 
Retreived from http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1410/Pigou_0316.pdf 
 134 
 
Schabauer, J. – Schimak, G. – Dünnebeil, G. – Litzenberger, M. (2012). openUwedat – A Toolbox 
Solution for Integrated Air Quality and Traffic Monitoring. The 26th International 
Conference on Informatics for Environmental Protection, (pp. 695-706). Dessau, ISBN: 978-
3-8440-1248-4 
Steuer, H. – Kunert, M. – Schulz, M. – Schilcher, M. (2010). Standards Based And Automated 
Processing Of Forest Spatial Indicators In The Context Of GMES And INSPIRE. 24th 
International Conference on Informatics for Environmental Protection, (pp. 17-22). 
Cologne/Bonn, ISBN: 978-3-8322-9458-8 
Szemenyei, M. (2015). Battling Transaction Costs: Establishing an e-Exchange System for Coaseian 
Bargaining. National Students' Scientific Association Conference. Budapest. 
Taylor, C. – Koomey, J. (2008). Estimating Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Internet 
Advertising. IMC: Technical Report, Retreived from 
http://evanmills.lbl.gov/commentary/docs/carbonemissions.pdf 
TEIR (2015, 07 21). Retrieved from http://www.teir.hu 
Vibrocomp. (2015, 07 21). Vibrocomp. Retrieved from http://vibrocomp.hu/hu/soundplan 
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. The 
American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 548-577, DOI: 10.1086/227496 
Williamson, O. E. (1998). The Insitutions of Governance. American Economic Review, 88, 75-79, 
Retreived from http://www.jstor.org/stable/116896 
Wilson, N. – Nghiem, N. – Foster, R. – Cobiac, L. – Blakely, T. (2012, 05 08). Estimating the cost of 
new public health legislation. Retrieved 06 30, 2015, from 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/7/11-097584/en/ 
zipp. (2011, 04 07). Megállapodást kötött a Sziget Kft. és Újpest önkormányzata. Retrieved from 
http://zipp.hu/belfold/2011/04/07/megallapodast_kotott_a_sziget_kft_es_ujpest_onkormanyz
ata 
 
